Un hotel se valora con tres métodos cruzados: múltiplo EBITDA normalizado (valor = EBITDA por múltiplo, entre 6x y 14x según el activo), precio por habitación como sanity check (unos 204.000 € de media en España en 2025), y DCF a 5-10 años. El valor defendible es el menor de los métodos bien hechos: antes de multiplicar hay que normalizar el EBITDA quitando extraordinarios y dotando reserva de CAPEX (3-5% de ingresos).
Valuation of a hotel isn't valuation of an apartment. A hotel's a property and a run at once and valuation has to capture both. The salesman will teach you a beautiful EBITDA and a price per room that "'s at market." Your job is to translate these figures into the only figure that matters: The highest price you can pay so that the deal doesn't eat your profitability on day one.
That article goes through the three methods that a professional investor crosses before making an offer - multiple EBITDA, price per room and flow discount (DCF) - and lands them at a pre-sign cascade. All market figures have a source and year. Those with no bad institutional source are marked as a sector estimate. No round promise.
1. A hotel is valued twice: business and property
The starting error is to value a hotel with the logic of housing: price per square and comparable metro of the neighborhood. That only measures the brick. But what you buy is an operating cash flow, and that flow can be more or less worth the property as it's been managed.
That's why we have two families with methods:
Income method (business)
Value the cash flow: Multiples EBITDA and DCF. He's the one that's in charge of a hotel under operation, because he measures what his assets are. generatesThat's how bad it was to build them.
Cost and comparable method (building)
Value the brick: price per room versus comparable transactions and replacement cost. It's the health check that detects if you pay above the market.
The fair value is usually minor of the two well-made approaches. If business justifies a high price but the brick's worth half, you have an exit risk. If the brick's worth a lot but the EBITDA doesn't resort, you're paying an option, not an asset. To cross both is what separates a profitable purchase from a trap.
2. ABITDA Multiple: photo of today
The most widely used method for hotel operations is the multiple about EBITDA: Value = standardised EBITDA × multiple. The EBITDA is the operational gain before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortification. The multiple market sets it with the risk and expected growth of the flow.
A market reference, the usual range moves between 6x and 14x (sector estimate). Within that range:
| Asset profile | Multiples of guidance EBITDA | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Value | 5-8x | Unstabilized EBITDA, have to run CAPEX and risk of performance |
| Hotel stabilized, secondary square | 8-10x | Retirement but lower output liquidity |
| Full-service / luxury in prima square | 11-13x | ABITDA stable, brand, institutional liquidity |
Market oriented ranges (sector estimate). The concrete multiple depends on category, location, operator contract and flow quality.
Multiples are not a number put by the seller: the asset deserves them. Two hotels with the same EBITDA last year are different if one has a solid operator's contract, stable employment and CAPEX a day and the other depends on high season, a single sales channel and delays maintenance. The multiples reflect that difference in quality and durability of EBITDA.
3. Normalizing EBITDA: That's where the trap's hidden
Before multiplying, we have to normalise The EBITDA that teach you. That's the most bad thing that saves (or sinks). A cheaply EBITDA for not giving up reservations or for not charging management makes you pay more without noticing.
To remove extraordinary
Unrecurrent income or expenses (a dedicated sale, a unique event) are not part of stable flow.
Impting market management
If the hotel is operated by the salesman's staff at no real cost reflected, a market management fee will be deducted. You're gonna pay for it.
Fitted with CAPEX Reserve (FF & E)
A 3-5% income for furniture, equipment and installations (sector estimate). An EBITDA without this reserve is accounting fiction.
Adjust undervalued items
Insurance, deferred maintenance, tourist fees, compliance costs (ES. Hostigages, RD 933 / 2021). What isn't at the P & L today will be paid tomorrow.
Just after these adjustments the EBITDA is comparable and the multiple means something. That's where professional management brings real value: knowing what's missing from a salesman's P & L is the difference between an honest valuation and a sun toast.
4. Price per room: Health market check
The price per room (enterprise value) is the quick contrast to the market. At 2025, the average price per room transformed in Spain was about 204.000 €second consecutive year above 200.000 (Christie & Co vía BrainsRE, 2025).
That national average includes the effect of operations upscale y de lujo en ubicaciones prime, así que tómala como techo de referencia, no como precio aplicable a cualquier activo. Un hotel de 2 estrellas en plaza secundaria no vale 204.000 € por habitación, igual que un 5 estrellas en el centro de Madrid puede valer mucho más. Lo que importa es comparar contra transactions of their same category and place.
The price per room serves to detect engas and dusts but never substitutes for an income valuation: a room only works what its cash flow can hold. If the price / room involves a multiple EBITDA out of range, there's an alarm sign.
5. DCF: The movie that the multiple doesn't see
The ABITDA Multiple is a fixed photo and the flow discount (DCF) is the film. The DCF projects the free cash flow to 5-10 years, discounts it at a rate that reflects the risk of the asset and adds an output value (typically EBITDA stabilized × multiple output or NOI figure).
The DCF captures what a single year's multiple cannot:
- Stability Ramp: if you buy to replace, the ABITDA of the year 1 isn't that of the year 3. The DCF models it.
- Stationality and occupation: A short season coastal asset has a different cash profile from an urban asset all year round.
- Capex scheduled: planned reforms that currently EBITDA does not reflect.
- Cap output rate: el yield prime hotelero ronda el 5–6% según plaza —más comprimido en Madrid/Barcelona, algo más alto en islas y plazas secundarias— (estimación sectorial), y ese cap rate de salida mueve la valoración tanto como el flujo.
The practice rule: if DCF and multiple give quite different figures, there's hidden the risk of the deal. Research the difference before signing, not after.
6. The pre-sign euro cascade: from EBITDA that teach you to the actual NOI
Here's Bliss's wedge applied to valuation. The salesman's giving you an EBITDA. Before applying a multiple, we have to lower them to actual NOI by hand Uncounting what isn't on his spreadsheet. An illustrative example of a 20 hotel rooms with 1.000.000 €'s Annual Income:
| Concept | Annual amount | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Gross income (Revpar × rooms × 365) | 1.000.000 € | 1.000.000 € |
| − Customer acquisition costs / cabling commission | −120.000 € | 880.000 € |
| − Personnel and operation (reception, cleaning, F & B) | −380.000 € | 500.000 € |
| − Supply, maintenance and insurance | −90.000 € | 410.000 € |
| _ | — | 410.000 € |
| − Market management fee (uncharged) | −40.000 € | 370.000 € |
| − Reserve CAPEX / FF & E (4% income) | −40.000 € | 330.000 € |
| − IBI, tourist fees, compliance | −30.000 € | 300.000 € |
| = actual standardised NOI | — | 300.000 € |
Examples with percentages of indicative cost structure (sector estimate). Each asset has its own P & L
La diferencia es brutal: a 10x, el EBITDA “de vendedor” (410.000 €) implica una valoración de 4,1 M €, mientras que el NOI normalizado (300.000 €) la deja en 3,0 M €. 1,1 million euro high price That they would have eaten your jield from day one. That's the difference between buying a holder and buying a cash flow.
And here goes the management lever: some of that channel cost (the 120.000 € of the example) is reduced when you re-direct them. Tudesvío, Bliss's direct channel, charges a commission 10% against 15-18% from OTAs (internal data Bliss) - isn't free, but every commission point you recover directly increases the NOI and thus the value of the asset to a multiple.
7. Bliss vs. market noise: how really valued
The hotel investment content in Spain is divided between those who sell you round upside with no method and those who give you macro data that do not lower the asset. The difference of Bliss is the pre-sign cascade with auditory figures.
| Valuation criterion | Bliss (preset cascade) | Yield round promise | Macro consultant |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard EBITDA (management + charged CAPEX) | Yeah, before applying multiple | Unadjusted EBITDA | Do not lower to P & L of asset |
| Flow with verifiable source | Colliers, BRE, STR, Christie & Co | "+ 40%," "150% Annual" without source | Yeah, but only macro |
| Multiple cross + price / hab. + DCF | The three methods cross | A single round number | Multibillionaire ticket, non-operative |
| NOI pallanca (direct channel, prizing) | Tudesvío 10% vs 15-18% OTAs | Without actual management | Do not manage the asset |
| Regulation risk by ACABQ at valuation | Mapeado (NRUA anulado STS 620/2026) | Unknown | Generic, not by neighborhood |
| Test with actual portfolio | 87% occupation, improvement versus mean | No sound track record | No assets |
To place valuation in its market context: hotel investment in Spain reached 4.275 M € at 2025, second best historic record (Colliers, 2025), of which 3.986 M €was for hotels already under operation (159 operations, 21.767 rooms). It's an expensive and competitive market: That's why it's the first - and most cheaply - source of profitability.
8. The pre-offer valuation checklist
Before you put a figure at the table, have this solved:
- Standard EBITDA with management, CAPEX and undervalued items charged.
- Reason Multiple by category, place and quality of the flow (not as requested by the seller).
- Prices per room contrast with comparable to its same category and CAA.
- DCF with stabilization ramp, scheduled CAPEX and explicit output cap.
- Cap output rate consistent with market (5-6% prime by place, sector estimate) and with asset liquidity.
- Regulatory risk The valuation changes if the asset cannot be exploited as expected.
- Loops of NOI identified: direct channel, dynamic pricing, low OTA dependence.
When the three methods converge into a range and the standardised NOI holds up with the target jield, you have a defensible offer. When they have fun, you have a risk to trade in prices. The valuation isn't to be right: it's to avoid overpay.
The valuation is only the first filter. The next step is the Due diligence complete That checks that these numbers hold and understand how operator's contract (fixed, variable or GOP) He shares the risk of the NOI that you have just assessed. If you want to see the complete return, review the profitability of buying hotel in Spain 2026 and, for personality assets, boutique hotels where repositioning adds scope. And if you doubt about buying the whole asset or just exploiting rooms, look. rooms in operation before buying the whole hotel.
FAQ
What multiple EBITDA are paid for by a hotel?
To reference, stabilized hotels are usually transformed around 8-12x EBITDA, while outstanding repositioning assets are low to 5-8x and FULL-service hotels at main square can reach 11-ZXQ- 13x (sector estimate). The usual market range moves between 6x and 14x by category, location, operator contract and flow quality. Multiples are not a fixed figure: they are determined by the stability and expected growth of EBITDA, and not by the optimism of the seller.
Do a hotel's valuation weigh more about its business or its property?
A hotel's both at once: a building and an ongoing business. That's why they coexist with the income method (a multiple EBITDA or DCF about the business flow) and with the cost or comparable method (brick value and price per room). To buy bad at either of them destroys the jield: to pay the business at a high number without EBITDA recurring, or to pay the brick above market, goes as expensive. The relative value is often the least of both cross-approaches.
How's a hotel's room price calculated?
The total price (enterprise value) is divided into the number of rooms. It's a quick check with the market: at 2025 the mean price per room transacted in Spain was about 204.000 €, second consecutive year above 200.000 (Christie & Co via BrainsRE, 2025). It serves to detect if an asset is expensive or cheap relative to comparable of its category and place but never substitutes for an income valuation: a room only worth what its cash flow can sustain.
What's a hotel's EBITDA and how does it suit before applying the multiple?
The EBITDA is the operational profit before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortification. Before multiplying this, we have to normalise it: remove income or extraordinary expenses, discount the market management fee if the hotel operates with the salesman's staff, provide a realistic reserve of CAPEX (FF & E) from the 3-5% income and adjust undervalued items as insurance or deferred maintenance. an EBITDA inflated by not providing CAPEX or without imputing management is the most common valuation trap.
What's the use of DCF if I have an ABITDA multiple?
The multiple is a photo of the present and the flow discount (DCF) is the film. The DCF projects free cash flow to 5-10 years, discounts at a rate that reflects asset risk and adds an output value. Captures what the multiple doesn't see: stabilization ramp after a reform, stationary, scheduled CAPEX and exit cap. If the DCF and the multiple give very different figures, there's hidden the risk of the deal.
Why are two hotels with the same EBITDA different?
Because the multiples reflect the quality and durability of that EBITDA. A hotel with a solid operator contract, stable employment, low dependence on a single channel and CAPEX a day deserves high multiple. One with focused income in season, deferred maintenance, high OTAs dependence or regulatory risk at your CAA is worth less though the EBITDA last year coincides. The price per room and DCF help put number to these differences.
How much did the Spanish hotel market invest at 2025?
La inversión hotelera en España alcanzó los 4.275 M € en 2025, segundo mejor registro histórico, con 194 operaciones totales (Colliers, 2025). De ese volumen, la compra de hoteles ya en explotación sumó 3.986 M € en 159 transacciones y 21.767 habitaciones (Colliers, 2025). El precio por habitación en máximos confirma que el mercado paga por activos prime, lo que hace más crítico no pagar de más en el tramo intermedio.
How does Bliss help with valuation before buying?
Bliss builds the pre-sign euro cascade of the asset: from the EBITDA that the seller teaches to the actual NOI in hand, normalizing management, CAPEX and channel dependence with each market figure anchored to verifiable source (Colliers, CBER, STR, Christie & co) and contrasted with actual portfolio data (87% occupation, improved versus market mean). The goal's that the price you pay doesn't eat the jield on day one.
Are you going to value a hotel or a building to buy?
We mount cross-valuation - a number of standard EBITDA, prices per room and DCF - with your actual numbers and every market figure anchored to source. That the price you pay doesn't destroy your jield.